An Open Letter Regarding Developments in the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist):

thanks to Paolo and CARC for picture

From Revolutionary Communists of Germany

Dear Comrades,

The publication by the Revolutionary Communist Party,USA (RCP,USA) of its exchange of letters with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN(M)] has, along with other documents recently made public and the course of developments in Nepal itself, made it abundantly clear that the very existence of the revolution in Nepal is hanging in the balance. The tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm and inspiration unleashed in Nepal and around the world by the launch and advance of the People’s War (PW) in that country are now in the process of being turned into their opposite by the incorrect line that is currently leading the CPN(M). All the great achievements and advances made in the revolutionary struggle in Nepal, especially the creation of a powerful People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the building of revolutionary base areas where red political power was established, and indeed, the concrete perspective of a communist-led revolution winning countrywide power for the first time in decades… all of these things which were won at the cost of great struggle and sacrifice by the masses, are in danger of being lost. Such a turn of events would not only be a huge tragedy for the revolutionary struggle in Nepal, but an enormous setback for the entire proletarian world revolution.

This is not something that communists anywhere can passively accept. And it is most definitely not a matter for the comrades in Nepal to deal with by themselves, or something that "outsiders" cannot sufficiently understand. Such a standpoint reflects the weakness of the thinking that denies the centrality of ideological and political line and views the communist revolution based on a country-by-country model.

In contrast to this wrong approach stands a correct understanding of the universality of the science of communism, the overall dynamic of the worldwide revolutionary process and the true meaning of proletarian internationalism.

From its very beginnings in the middle of the 19th century the communist movement has been an international movement with the aim establishing a communist world. Internationalism was from the start a central element of a communist worldview and major questions facing the communist movement were routinely debated on an international level. With the emergence of imperialism and the establishment of the contradiction between socialised production and private appropriation as the fundamental contradiction on a world level, the material basis was laid for the communist revolution to become fully consolidated as a single integrated worldwide process. Political power must still be mainly won on the country level, but the revolutionary process in each country and region is a component part of a larger process unfolding on the international level. These two levels of organisation interpenetrate with and condition one another, and the border between them is relative and conditional, but overall the international level is principal and determining.

Looked at in this way, the material and philosophical basis for the central role of internationalism can be more clearly seen. As comrade Avakian pointed out in Advancing the World Revolutionary Movement: Questions of Strategic Orientation, internationalism "…really has to be the foundation and starting point for the proletariat in all countries: the proletariat in advancing the struggle can only advance it by approaching it, and seeking to advance it, on a world level first of all." This has concrete meaning. Avakian goes on to say:

"If we’re really internationalists, if we really understand the importance of proceeding from the world arena and the interests of the world revolution above all, then there is a question of methods involved, and how we struggle with each other; there is a question of our epistemology, our theory of knowledge, and what we think the relationship between practice and theory, and perceptual and rational knowledge, is; there are all those questions of methodology that are also questions of line and have to be struggled out. But essentially the question is communists coming together in the most organized way to give the most powerful expression to formulating and carrying out the lines and policies to advance the struggle on a world scale and with concentration on particular key points at any given time in the world struggle." (ibid)

In the article On Developments in Nepal and the Stakes for the Communist Movement the RCP makes the following statement regarding the application of these principles: "In deciding to make these letters public, the RCP is proceeding from the bedrock understanding that communists are not representatives of this or that nation, but of the world proletariat, and that their cause is the cause of emancipating all humanity." (pg. 18)

Today’s communist movement was founded on the basis of two great international line struggles: the struggle that Mao initiated and led against the modern revisionists in the Soviet Union who had come to power following Stalin’s death; and the struggle to expose and oppose the revisionists who seized power in China following Mao’s death, including the intense battle to uphold and defend Mao’s qualitative contributions to Marxism-Leninism—a struggle, which to a great extent, was led by Chairman Avakian of the RCP,USA.

The current struggle over the leading line within the CPN(M) is of a similar nature. All communists—and all those who support the struggle for a communist world—must recognize the necessity posed by the emergence of a revisionist line in the CPN(M) and take up the struggle to transform this necessity in a revolutionary fashion. This means, in particular, going deeply into the theoretical and political questions that are being posed, analysing them systematically and in every way possible fighting for a correct understanding of these questions internationally and in Nepal itself. This includes making these questions known broadly to the revolutionary masses everywhere.

For this reason we are calling on communists and revolutionary minded people around the world to translate the documents that the RCP has released, study them carefully and help make them available to as many people as possible. Successfully carrying out this task will be extremely important to waging this struggle.

Of course the CPN(M) leadership denies that their line is leading to revisionist capitulation. What is particularly troubling is the fact that the leadership of the CPN(M) has essentially boycotted discussion and struggle internationally. They found it necessary to reply to only the first of the RCP’s letters. And this reply is woefully inadequate: the line it promotes is not only incorrect, but it also fails to even engage most of the key questions and criticisms raised by the RCP.
For example, the CPN(M) writes: "The RCP’s criticism that the CPN (Maoist) is sliding towards the abandonment of the proletarian dictatorship by adopting bourgeois formal democracy reflects your Party’s unawareness to reach at the crux of the problem we are raising." (Letter from the CC of the CPN(M) to the CC of the RCP,USA, July 2006, pg. 6) From today’s perspective the irony of this statement could not be greater. Since "sliding towards the abandonment of the proletarian dictatorship" is undeniably what has happened. As to be expected the CPN(M) has sought to disguise its abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat with eclectic formulations and confused statements regarding the character of the state and the historical role and content of democracy. But as the analysis in the RCP’s letters shows, the current leading line in the CPN(M) has not only abandoned the proletarian dictatorship, but the struggle for a communist world as a whole.

This letter is not an attempt at making a comprehensive criticism of the errors in the line of the CPN(M) or even in the letter that the CPN(M) leadership did choose to write. The RCP and others have made an excellent all-around analysis in this regard. However we do want to draw comrades’ attention to a few specific points:

1. The role of theory and historic strategic errors.

The CPN(M) states in its letter from July 2006: "Memorizing things from books and interpreting for hours and hours on their basis is one thing, and applying them in living practice is qualitatively another. Frankly speaking, it is very easy not to commit any mistakes in strategy. But it is extremely difficult to take up and apply appropriate tactics in the service of strategy."

This passage concentrates al consciousness or understanding: it requires science. The struggle to grasp, apply and further develop the revolutionary science of communism, and to arm increasingly broader sections of the masses with this understanding, is an on-going task and a matter of life and death: as Mao pointed out, ideological and political line is indeed decisive.
While it is true that if we restricted ourselves to reading books alone and did not seek to combine theory with practice, we could neither truly grasp revolutionary theory nor correctly develop it: that is not the problem here. Through the entire first wave of communist revolution and beyond, our movement has accumulated a vast store of practical experience to draw from. In addition, the RCP as well as all the parties and organizations of our movement as a whole have carried out a tremendous amount of practice over the last 30 years. The CPN(M)’s statement quoted above is essentially a very concentrated expression of pragmatism and empiricism: "What need is there for a deep understanding of the underlying laws governing the motion and development of matter and society?", they ask, "What we need are practical answers."

But as historical experience has repeatedly shown, without a scientific theory to guide it, there can be no revolution. The "answers" that are formulated on the basis of pragmatism and empiricism can never lead to a communist world. The implication here is that the analysis and criticism formulated by the RCP are merely the repetition of phrases from books without any underlying understanding or relevance. If this were actually true, then it should have been easy for the CPN(M) to refute them. Instead, in its letter to the RCP the CPN(M) leadership treats us to what are mainly complaints, insults and efforts at changing the subject.

In the midst of his last great battle against the revisionists in China Mao made the following famous admonition: "Our country at present practises a commodity system, the wage system is unequal, too, as in the eight-grade wage scale, and so forth. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat such things can only be restricted. Therefore, if people like Lin Piao come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system. That is why we should do more reading of Marxist-Leninist works." (cited in Peking Review, #13, March 26, 1976, our emphasis)

Is it not obvious that the logic and approach of the CPN(M) is the exact opposite from that of Mao? Mao does not say, "There is the danger of revisionism, that is why above everything else we need flexible tactics and practical answers." Again, that is not to say that we do not need correct (and flexible) tactics and practical answers; we do. The question is how and on what basis are these formulated so that they actually serve the goal of a communist world as well as the immediate struggle. For this to be the case, as Mao emphasizes, one must understand the decisive role of ideological and political line and the need for the whole party and the broad masses to more deeply stu;ly made major strategic errors that have resulted in lost opportunities and even grievous setbacks. Astonishingly, the CPN(M) seems completely unaware of this fact.

For example there is the question the strategic path of the revolution in the oppressed countries. Mao developed the theory of new democratic revolution and protracted People’s War in opposition to the predominant line on these questions within the International Communist Movement (ICM). As a result, despite favourable conditions for revolution in similar countries around the world, China is the only country in which a successful new democratic revolution has taken place.

Similarly there is the question of the strategic path in the imperialist countries and the fact that beginning in the early 1920’s and for decades that followed the entire ICM abandoned the basically correct approach developed by Lenin and which is known today as the "October Road". During the whole period of the Comintern and beyond, an essentially economist and parliamentary reformist strategy was followed in these countries. The results of these strategic errors were lost revolutionary opportunities in a whole series of countries.

There is the vital strategic question of the relation of the defence of socialist countries to the overall advance of the world revolutionary struggle. In this regard the ICM made major strategic errors in the Cominterm period by equating the defence of the Soviet Union with the overall advance of the revolution internationally and even subordinating the overall interests and advance of the world revolution to this defence. These errors resulted in grave setbacks for our movement, including the Soviet Union actually turning its back on and even openly opposing revolutionary struggles in certain countries.

Furthermore these errors had a serious negative influence on the line Mao followed in the 1960’s and 1970’s in seeking to defend China from imperialist encirclement and attack. The result was that the revisionists in China were significantly strengthened and the whole world movement suffered problems of orientation from which it has still not recovered.

It is over 25 years since Avakian first made the analysis cited above, that communist strategy must proceed "from the world arena and the interests of the world revolution above all". Without understanding the objective truth that the proletarian revolution is a single integrated worldwide process and all the strategic implications this understanding contains, it will not be possible to formulate a correct strategy for the world revolution or in a particular country. This understanding is an important component of the all-around new synthesis that comrade Avakian has developed. To its great detriment, most of those in our movement continue to fail to understand the profound meaning and central importance of Avakian’s insights into this question.

The strategic errors listed here and the incorrect theoretical and methodological approach used to formulate and justify them, have historically caused great damage to our cause. There is perhaps no better current example of the major strategic errors our movement has made than those of the CPN(M) itself.

Their claim that the strategy of new democratic revolution can be modified to include an entire stage of bourgeois democracy and capitalist development is completely wrong. The assertion that this fundamental shift in strategy is merely a "tactical" manoeuvre is—frankly, and as discussed below—absurd. The CPN(M) confounds strategy and tactics (as well as quantity and quality) and suffers from the malady of thinking that by redefining something in words, one can change its actual objective character. In reality—and the idealist assertions of the CPN(M) notwithstanding—you can call a tree a goat, but that will not cause a tree to give milk.
Without correct tactics the revolution cannot succeed. But these can only be formulated through a correct understanding and application of communist theory and in the context of a correct strategic approach and framework: both for the revolution in a particular country as well as the world revolution as a whole, and rooted in a correct understanding of the dialectical relationship between the two. The failure of the CPN(M) leadership to grasp this point correctly is one important expression of the incorrect tendencies in their basic methodological approach.

2. The CPN(M) and the materialist conception of society and history.

The CPN(M) discusses the question of democracy and the state detached from their historical development, objective role and class content. As the RCP wrote:

"More generally, the CPN(M)’s declaration that it is using the existing state in Nepal, shorn of its monarchical features, as a springboard for liberation is a dangerous illusion. As has been repeatedly stressed—but cannot be stressed too many times, given how much this is a source of deadly illusions—the reactionary state is not a classless instrument that can serve the proletariat or bourgeoisie alike, depending merely on who is holding it in their hands. The state is not the same as the government, and in particular parliaments—which, as Lenin pointedly noted, can be readily dissolved, if the core of the ruling class finds it in its interests to do so. The state, on the other hand, is an integrated, historically evolved machinery of military and bureaucratic power that reflects, embodies and serves the dominant social and economic relations and the ruling class (or classes) that sit atop them.

The idea that the machinery of the exploiting classes can be taken over as it is, or ‘restructured’—but not smashed and dismantled—and then can be used for the ends of emancipating the oppressed, and ultimately humanity as a whole, goes against the scientific summation of the class character of every state and of countless experiences where the exact opposite has occurred instead: those who began with revolutionary aspirations but fell into these illusions about the state have been swallowed up time and again and transformed into upholders of the very system which oppresses the masses, and/or they have been ruthlessly crushed." (Letter from the RCP, Nov. 2008, pg. 8)

One of the key features of the CPN(M)’s incorrect approach to discussing the nature of democracy, the state and the superstructure in general during the "transitional capitalist stage" is that it divorces these from the economic base—from the character of the relations of production. In doing so it departs from the materialist conception of history and replaces this with what is essentially an idealist notion of society.

In Anti-Dühring Engels made the following famous observation:

"The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or estates is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought, not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch."

It is true that this statement has, in the history of our movement, often been narrowly interpreted so that out of Engels’ observation that the "final causes of all social changes and political revolutions" are to be found in the mode of production and exchange, the mechanical notion has been construed that therein lies the "sole cause" of such changes. This wrong understanding of the point that Engels makes here has been one of the underpinnings of tendencies in the communist movement toward mechanical materialism and historical determinism.

It is also true that overall our understanding of the dynamic role of the superstructure, the ways in which it has relative independence from and reacts upon and influences the base has been inadequate. Nevertheless, while it is extremely important to advance our understanding of this question, the basic approach to understanding the development of human society that Engels describes here, is indispensable to scientifically understanding these questions and the tasks of the communist-led revolution at every stage.

Once the dialectical and materialist conception of history and analysis of society is abandoned, communist concepts are robbed of their revolutionary content and rapidly become communist sounding rhetoric with social democratic content. This can be clearly seen in how the CPN(M) deals with the question of what it calls "the democratic republic". In its letter of July 2006 to the RCP the CPN(M) wrote:

"[O]ur Party has viewed the democratic republic neither as the bourgeois parliamentarian republic nor directly as the new-democratic one. This republic, with an extensive reorganization of the state power as to resolve the problems related with class, nationality, region and sex prevailing in the country, would play a role of transitional multiparty republic. Certainly, the reactionary class and their parties will try to transform this republic into a bourgeois parliamentarian one, whereas our Party of the proletarian class will try to transform it into a new-democratic republic" (pg. 8)

Here the CPN(M) contends that this "transitional multiparty republic" will be "neither…bourgeois, …nor directly…new-democratic" and will "resolve the problems related with class, nationality, region and sex prevailing in the country". This is impossible.

It is impossible because, as the citation above from the RCP explains, this "democratic republic" cannot be a neutral arena open to being transformed into either a "bourgeois" or a "new-democratic" republic. Contrary to the CPN(M)’s two-into-one eclectics, it will, from the start, have a principal aspect. And because the CPN(M) is talking about "restructuring" (i.e. perfecting) the existing bourgeois state—not smashing it—and this state will site atop and be forced to serve the "three mountains" of "imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism", its bourgeois aspect will of necessity be principal. It can be nothing other than a bourgeois dictatorship.

Moreover the CPN(M) is, in its own words, speaking of a "republic" that will be the form of state during a relatively long period ("era") of capitalist development. What is remarkable about this contention is that the CPN(M) acts as though capital does not have objective laws which govern its motion and development. However as Marx discovered, and history has confirmed, it does.
Marx revealed that money can become capital only when the capitalist is "so lucky as to find, within the sphere of circulation, in the market, a commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value"(Capital, Volume One, Chapter Six). That "peculiar" commodity is nothing other than human labour-power, which the workers—stripped of all other means to live—are forced to sell to the capitalists in order to survive.

Capital, Marx showed, is a social relation and a process. Its laws of operation mean, among other things, that capital can only exist when it is in motion—in the process of accumulating: the "restless" effort to expand. Because capital can only exist as many capitals and the aim of capitalist commodity production is the production of exchange values and not use values, the state of capital’s existence is the compulsion to "self-expansion". This "self-expansion"—accumulation—takes place in the context of competition among individual capitals and through the appropriation of surplus value—the exploitation of human labour power.

As Marx also discovered, capitalist commodity production and exchange is governed, or regulated, by the law of value. He demonstrated that the value of a commodity—its exchange value—is based on the average socially necessary amount of time needed for its production and that this measure of value is the basis for the exchange of equivalents. This is an objectively existing law that asserts itself regardless of the subjective will or understanding of any individual person or group of persons. Any capitalist who attempts to ignore this law will quickly be ruined. There are no innovative policies or social democratic schemes that can annul this, or the other, inherent characteristics of capital.

Fundamentally, in today’s world, there are only two basic ways through which production and exchange can be organized. One is based on the law of value. If the law of value governs production, it will, of necessity, be capitalist production that must aim for and serve the maximum self-expansion of capital: i.e. put profit—and not the needs of people and society—in command.

Until communist society has been achieved, the only other way production can be organized is on a conscious and planned non-exploiting basis where labour power is not a commodity and the needs of humanity and the continuing revolution guide both what is produced, and, how it is produced. Where the law of value, which must be taken into account as long as there is payment for work and exchange through money, is being consciously restricted to the greatest extent possible at every particular stage as part of the worldwide revolutionary process of transforming all of society and eliminating the "4 Alls"—including money and all forms of commodity production and exchange, etc. This requires the proletariat and its allies to have state power and the ownership and control over the large-scale means of production to be in the hands of society as a whole: i.e. socialism. There is no "third way".

This is why, in discussing the new democratic revolution and state, Mao stressed that, "If such a republic is to be established in China, it must be new-democratic not only in its politics but also in its economy. It will own the big banks and the big industrial and commercial enterprises. Enterprises, such as banks, railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital." (On New Democracy, our emphasis).

In contrast to Mao’s understanding and approach we have the claims of the CPN(M) that a bourgeois republic (i.e. bourgeois dictatorship) in which the economy is dominated by private capital (i.e. bureaucrat, foreign and imperialist capital) can be "structured so as to resolve the basic problems of the oppressed classes, nationalities, sex and regions, the content of the new-democratic revolution." (Letter to the RCP, July 2006) If this reformist pipe dream were actually true communist revolution would be completely superfluous. But in reality, and independent of whatever subjective desires or illusions the leadership of the CPN(M) may have, and no matter how many parties participate in the bourgeois parliament, with the bourgeois state machinery intact and the logic and laws of capital dominating the economy it will not be possible to break the hold of imperialism or to thoroughly uproot feudalism in Nepal as part of the worldwide struggle for communist society. Correspondingly, none of the "basic problems" of the people will be "resolved".

Describing the process of capitalist accumulation in Anti-Dühring Engels quotes Marx as follows: "Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole… (Marx's Capital, p. 671.)."

The question of the superstructure cannot be understood divorced from the character of the economic base, or, as Lenin so insightfully remarked, "politics is a concentrated expression of economics." The CPN(M)’s capitalist "democratic republic" can, for the broad masses, have only one result: the further "accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation". This understanding is basic to the ABC’s of Marxism.

3. The strategic offensive, a "political solution" and the method of scientific communism.

In connection with the ceasefire and negotiations in 2001 the CPN(M) first proposed terms under which it said it was prepared to end the People’s War (PW). This was described as "a political solution in the form of an interim government, a new constitution and institutionalization of the republic." Sometime later these "three conditions" were somewhat modified to include: a roundtable of all parties, an interim government and the election of a constituent assembly. At the time they were first proposed, the CPN(M) stated that these "three conditions" were just a "tactic". It was asserted that proposing these conditions was not tantamount to abandoning the strategy of new democratic revolution, but a way to advance to that goal. At that point the CPN(M) made no real effort that we are aware of to explain how this "solution" could actually lead to carrying through the new democratic revolution. Nevertheless, the Party was still professing that it’s strategic goal was new democracy, socialism and communism.

We do not doubt that the leadership of the CPN(M) meant what it said at that time; that is not the point. Line is decisive and every ideological and political line has an objective content and internal logic. Even if the leadership of the CPN(M) was convinced that this—and similar proposals—were in fact just a "tactic" and they actually intended to hold firmly to revolutionary goals, the objective logic of this proposal and the method used to formulate and propose it would—if not broken with—threaten to overwhelm those intentions. And this is exactly what is happening. As explained more fully below, this "tactic" was coupled with and was an expression of an entire package of what are essentially revisionist positions on a whole series of questions central to the revolution that were beginning to be developed and adopted by the CPN(M) during this same period. A process that took a leap at the CPN(M) Central Committee meeting in October 2005 and today has emerged as a full-blown revisionist line.

This is not to say that it is wrong in principle to ever agree to a ceasefire and/or negotiations: quite the contrary. It is hard to conceive of a protracted revolutionary war in which both negotiations at different points, as well as ceasefires, will not be necessary. When these measures are correct and what concrete proposals can and should be made or agreed to depends on the concrete time, place and situation. Mao remarked that waging "tit for tat" struggle means that sometimes one engages in negotiations and sometimes not. However, as Mao also pointed out, such negotiations and agreements can never "damage the fundamental interests of the people". Agreeing to permanently end the PW, dismantle the PLA, the revolutionary base areas and red political power short of countrywide victory does just that. And this was the objective content of these "three conditions".

Even if it was true that in 2001, when the "three conditions" were first proposed, the CPN(M) had no intention of actually agreeing to implement them, it was incorrect to do so. As a matter of principle communists can never propose conditions that they in fact believe to be unacceptable, in the hope that the enemy will turn them down. To do so means to engage in pragmatic realpolitik and to promote "political truth". It means that instead of training the communists and masses to apply dialectical and historical materialism to understand reality as it objectively exists—objective truth—and on that basis to transform the world in a revolutionary manner, they are, for "tactical" reasons, told things which are known to be untrue. This not only leads to confusion and disorientation as the twists and turns of events unfold, but overall trains the party and masses in the method of pragmatism and empiricism instead of scientific communism. Trained in such a method, neither the communists nor the masses will be able to distinguish Marxism from revisionism, nor increasingly take the leadership of the revolution and society as a whole into their own hands so as to be able to emancipate all of humanity.

In August 2004 the CPN(M) declared that the PW in Nepal had reached the stage of the "strategic offensive". This meant that the Party had determined that the balance of forces had shifted decisively in favour of the revolution and they were able to make their immediate aim the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, the countrywide seizure of power, and the establishment of a new democratic state. Communists and revolutionaries around the world warmly greeted this announcement. It was a source of great hope and inspiration.

In light of the declaration that the PW had entered the stage of the strategic offensive it was remarkable that in 2005 the CPN(M) Central Committee adopted a resolution which said in part: "Now the slogan of interim government, election of the constituent assembly and democratic republic that our Party, taking into account the international and domestic balance of power, has formulated is a tactical slogan put forward for the forward-looking political way out."
Here the call for a "roundtable of all parties" is replaced with a call for a "democratic republic", and all three demands are again described as "tactical slogans". However these slogans do not represent a tactic, but a fundamental shift away from the strategy of new democratic revolution. If the immediate aim of the PW is no longer to win countrywide victory, smash the reactionary state, establish a new democratic state and open the way for the socialist revolution—all under the leadership of the proletariat and its vanguard party and as a conscious part of and base area for the communist world revolution; then, seen objectively and independent of one’s intentions, the actual strategic goal can only be a bourgeois republic and a capitalist system that will, of necessity, be dominated by foreign capital and imperialism.

In November 2006 the CPN(M) signed the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA), accepted the "three conditions", agreed to end the PW, dismantle people’s power and the people’s army and reverse the revolutionary transformations made in the base areas during the PW. The CPN(M) repeats almost daily its promise to never again engage in armed struggle. The theoretical conclusion that abandoning the immediate goal of new democracy would result in abandoning the PW—and revolution overall—and accepting bourgeois society and rule was (once again) confirmed in practice.

We want to make clear here, that all of this does not mean that there is no possibility of significant armed conflict breaking out again in Nepal. Even with the re-structuring that has taken place, the reactionary Nepali state remains unstable. The coalition government that the CPN(M) is currently leading is ripe with contradictions and could collapse. The Nepal Army, the core of the state power, remains firmly under the control of the reactionary ruling classes and their foreign masters, so that the possibility of a military coup continues to be a real factor shaping events. Various nationality- and caste-based groups have been forming and some are using arms to push their demands. For all these reasons, the CPN(M), or sections of the Party, could be forced to resume some form of armed activity. However, if there is not a fundamental rupture with the present leading line in the Party, such activity would not represent the resumption of a genuine revolutionary People’s War with the immediate aim of carrying through the new democratic revolution as a conscious component of the struggle for the ultimate goal of a communist world.

The documents from the RCP make the following analysis of the line questions and the struggle within the CPN(M) which led to the adoption of what is now clearly a revisionist political line and programme:

"By ‘line’ we mean the outlook and orientation, strategic conception and method which guide political activity in one direction or another. The decisive turn took place in October 2005 when a sharp struggle within the Party was ‘resolved’ in a revisionist fashion… While a few leaders of the CPN(M), especially Baburam Bhattarai, have loudly proclaimed loyalty to ‘democracy’—meaning Western-style bourgeois democracy—and expressed a negative verdict on the whole first wave of proletarian revolution, most of the other central Party leaders proclaimed just as loudly their support for the goals of establishing new democracy, socialism and communism while insisting that limiting the struggle to a fight for a ‘transitional’ (read bourgeois) republic was only a ‘tactic.’ Indeed, CPN(M) leaders in general have continually tried to focus the debate on the question of ‘tactics,’ as if the essential question were how to achieve a ‘federal democratic republic,’ not what kind of state, and more fundamentally what kind of social system, was needed in Nepal and the world." (On Developments in Nepal and the Stakes for the Communist Movement, pg. 5-6 )
And further:

"Unfortunately, the line struggle within the CPN(M) at that time was resolved on a very bad basis by the Central Committee (CC) meeting held in October of 2005… Far from repudiating the arguments of Bhattarai’s ‘New State’ article, the Central Committee adopted his core arguments. In a Communique of the CPN(M) CC, the line differences in the Party were dismissed as a ‘misunderstanding.’ The plan to go for a ‘transitional republic’ was adopted by the Party, with the proviso that this was only a ‘tactic’ while it was asserted that the Party remained true to its long term goals of new democratic revolution, socialism and communism. Bhattarai was reincorporated into the leadership of the Party on this basis. This method of uniting two contradictory opinions was heralded as a great achievement and was upheld as a model for the whole international communist movement.

This particular form of revisionism—eclecticism, or the attempted reconciliation of irreconcilable opposites, the combination of Marxism (in words) with revisionism in essence—had long been a problem in the thinking of the CPN(M) leaders but became enshrined and defended as a principle in the aftermath of the 2005 ‘inner party struggle.’" (ibid, pg. 9)
Here it can again be seen that the understanding of the decisiveness of ideological and political line—including the basic method used to formulate that line—is not just a theoretical assertion, but an objective truth repeatedly confirmed in practice. The fundamental change of course that the CPN(M) announced in 2005 was framed with the statement that it took "into account the international and domestic balance of power" and was an effort to find a "forward-looking way out". A mention of the stage of the "strategic offensive" was nowhere to be found: neither that it continued to exist, nor that it had been beaten back.

Among others, the question poses itself: what happened to the "strategic offensive"? In 2004 the CPN(M) declared that the perspective of countrywide victory in the PW as at hand. But just one year later—and despite the fact that the PLA had suffered no major strategic defeat—we find the CPN(M) looking not for victory, but for a "way out" and no explanation as to what had changed.

What is more the CPN(M) has implied—and individual leaders have made some public statements to the effect—that the People’s War could not advance any further and/or Nepal’s landlocked position between China and India meant that the countrywide revolutionary seizure of power could never be successfully consolidated. Therefore, according to this thinking, the only way to prevent a major setback or even a collapse of the revolution was to drop the immediate goal of new democratic revolution and seek some kind of "forward-looking way out" short of new democracy ("institutionalise" the gains of the revolution as it is often put). In other words, in addition to their theoretical arguments regarding bourgeois democracy and the need for a "capitalist stage", they added a pragmatic component that there was no other "practical" path then to abandon the PW and the immediate struggle for new democracy.

Given all this the CPN(M) must explain on what basis it declared the PW to have entered the stage of the strategic offensive in the first place. If it has analysed that conditions have changed, then it should declare this and explain why and how this happened. Or, if it now believes that its original analysis was wrong, then it should explain this error and its causes. But to just act as if none of this was ever said is to depart from a serious and scientific approach and replace such an approach with the cheap goods of pragmatic "political truth". Science on the other hand, including revolutionary science, requires—as Mao put it—honesty.

4. The question of strategy, the Comprehensive Peace Accords and the seizure of countrywide power.

From the time the concept of entering into an entire stage of a "transitional democratic republic" and "capitalist development" was first proposed, there has been talk that this was somehow preparation for an insurrection of some type that would result in the seizure of countrywide power. But as came to light in the polemics against the "Asumir (peace) line" in Peru, once a genuine PW has started, it is impossible to end the war and dismantle the people’s armed forces and to think that the PW (or in this case an armed insurrection) can be restarted at will at a later date. Consequently, this "explanation" was at best an illusion and at worst revisionist double-talk.

In the years following its first proposal for a "political solution" to the PW in 2001, the CPN(M) more fully developed the theory of a transitional bourgeois state and capitalist stage, which then led to and justified accepting the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) and the outcome of the election that did take place. While we unequivocally reject this step, we do not rule out the possibility that it might have even been necessary, as a tactical measure, to have participated in an election following the events of April/May 2006 when the king was forced to abdicate. Of course the mass outpourings that led to the king’s abdication would have had significantly different contours and dynamics if the CPN(M) had not, during the preceding years, been promoting bourgeois democracy and capitalism as a "forward-looking way out". But in any case, such participation—if it had in fact been necessary—could never have been based on agreeing to permanently end the PW, dismantle the PLA and the revolutionary base areas and politically announcing that something short of new democracy could "resolve" the people’s problems.

In its letter to the RCP, the CPN(M) writes: "That is why, whether imperialism will tolerate us or not is not the question at all behind our tactics; with which tactics we can defeat imperialism in the present context is the only question." (pg. 12) This presentation of tactics as the "only question" is incorrect.

What strategy one is following is not fixed in stone or resolved by declarations. The concrete policies and tactics that one is applying at any particular point must actually reflect and express this strategy and strategic goal, or you are following a different strategy – consciously or unconsciously. Furthermore, the Soviet Union defeated Germany and its allies in WWII. Its strategy and tactics were successful in achieving this goal. Nevertheless, from the point of view of advancing to a communist world its strategy was wrong. Just because a tactic—or even a strategy—can result in a short-term gain, does not necessarily mean it is correct or successful from the point of view the struggle for communism.

When one examines the line and policies of the CPN(M) it is hard to escape the conclusion that it thinks that just by proclaiming a goal, be it "new democracy", "socialism" or "communism", this proclamation itself settles the question of what "strategy" one is following, without having to specify the content of that goal and how—through what concrete process—that proclaimed goal is going to be achieved. Such proclamations alone—even when they are honestly declared—do not in fact constitute a "strategy".

In the context of this wrong understanding of what constitutes a strategy, the CPN(M) then proceeds to declare the question of "tactics" as the heart of the matter. In particular, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the CPN(M) believes that communist strategy and tactics consists, in its essence, of at every stage identifying a "main enemy" and then seeking to unite with "secondary enemies" in order to isolate and defeat whoever has been identified as the "main enemy" at a particular point. This is also wrong.

On the international level this concept cannot be a general strategy since there is no "main enemy" internationally other than the world system of imperialism itself. This wrong conception was practiced in relation to the defence of the Soviet Union with disastrous results. In China, even though Mao broke with the worst aspects of this approach—most especially with the concept that the defence of a socialist country was equal to, or even had priority over, the overall advance of the world revolution—nevertheless it was this basic approach that guided his international efforts to defend China from imperialist encirclement and attack and led to some serious errors.

In relation to the revolution within a particular country, this approach can under specific conditions be correct. However it is not a general strategic principle that a specific revolution must, in every situation—or at every stage—"unite with secondary enemies". For one, because these "secondary enemies" may not themselves be prepared to "unite" with the revolution under terms which do not compromise basic revolutionary goals and principles—"the fundamental interests of the people"—and for another because a favourable balance of forces may make possible the defeat of both the "main enemy" as well as the "secondary enemies" at the same time.

Some have criticized the leadership of the CPN(M) for making too many concessions to achieve the CPA and the election. They argue that the strength of the revolution at the time the CPA was signed should have allowed for much better terms: for example no cantonments or disarmament of the PLA, no dissolution of the base areas, etc. But this line of thinking misses the point.

The problem was not how to be more skilful in negotiating the CPA, the problem was the very concept: or to put it more directly, the problem was the CPN(M)’s overall line itself, not the implementation of that line. The CPA was only possible with the basic terms it actually contains. It is clear that the reactionary classes and especially their foreign backers would never have accepted any terms for an election that could have paved the way for the successful establishment of a new democratic state. That would have meant them accepting surrender through negotiations before the reactionary army had been defeated on the battlefield. This was never an option for them.

Thus, if the "three conditions" were ever accepted the only possible result was what we are now witnessing. The terms the CPN(M) agreed to—ending the revolution—corresponded to the line, program and goals the Party had formulated at that point. Thus the CPA, as it stands, was for the Party leadership a "success". Why should they have refused to sign it?

5. Reality, and the reality of the deadly combination of eclecticism and pragmatism.
Over the last 6 years and more we have been increasingly troubled by the wrong direction the line of the CPN (M) has been taking. However, in this regard, we must unfortunately conclude that for our part we waited much too long before attempting to vigorously engage the comrades of the CPN (M) around these burning questions. This error needs to be summed up more thoroughly and corrected. Among other things, it reflects an underestimation of the critical and decisive role of ideological and political line.

As mentioned above, in this debate the leadership of the CPN (M) has pursued a kind of two-track approach. On the one hand they have attempted to support their line and policies with eclectic theoretical arguments about the nature of the state, democracy, dictatorship of the proletariat, etc. Indeed, as the letters from the RCP extensively analyse, eclecticism has become a major feature of the CPN(M)’s basic line and approach. And as the following quote from Lenin—also cited in the RCP’s letter of November 2008—states, adopting eclectics can only result in falling into opportunism: "In falsifying Marxism in opportunist fashion, the substitution of eclecticism for dialectics is the easiest way of deceiving the people. It gives an illusory satisfaction; it seems to take into account all sides of the process, all trends of development, all the conflicting influences, and so forth, whereas in reality it provides no integral and revolutionary conception of the process of social development at all."(Lenin, The State and Revolution, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 405.)

At the same time, the CPN(M) leadership has advanced a "practical" line of argumentation, asserting that the revolution in Nepal has faced concrete problems that needed to be solved in order to advance and that the solutions to these concrete problems are not to be found in an application of the "ABC’s of Marxism".

At its heart, this approach essentially denies both the existence of knowable laws of motion governing the development of human society and, ultimately, the basic materialist understanding that objective reality and truth exist. One result is that this method winds up denying the scientific character of communism and the necessity of using a scientific method when applying communist principles to solve concrete problems. It reduces communist science to a grab bag of positions and quotations whose use—or lack thereof—is determined by whatever seems to serve some immediate some political aim: instrumentalism. Objective truth is thus replaced with political truth and instead of tactics flowing from and serving strategic aims and goals, "tactics are everything" becomes the guiding principle.

In addition to instrumentalism, this "practical" line of argument is an expression of the influence of pragmatism (and related to this—empiricism and positivism as well) within the ICM. The whole history of revolutionary struggle has shown that every revolution has been confronted with new problems whose solution demanded new answers—both theoretical and practical. History has also repeatedly shown that if a revolution is to advance revolutionary answers to these new problems must be found. And that these answers are first theoretically developed—based on a summation and synthesis of previous practice and experience, broadly understood—and then practically applied.

This is what Lenin repeatedly did in leading the Bolsheviks at decisive points in the course of the revolution in Russia by writing such works as What is to be Done, Materialism and Empiro-Criticism, State and Revolution and Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, etc. And this is also what Mao did in the course of the revolution in China—when he advanced the Marxist understanding of dialectics, formulated the theory of new democratic revolution, of protracted People’s War and especially in regards to continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and in launching the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, etc. In all these cases breakthroughs in practice were preceded by leaps in theoretical understanding.

In contrast to this correct understanding of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice and the process through which the leap from perceptual to rational knowledge takes place the CPN(M) presents the problem as follows:

"In this regard one of the most important aspects is how to defend, apply and develop our scientific and all powerful ideology, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. How to defend our invincible ideology? It can be defended by applying it into the concrete reality of a concrete situation. When it is applied in a concrete reality, it gives rise to some new developments. The only way to develop the scientific ideology is by its application. It develops only when it is applied in a correct way." ("Overcome the challenges to achieve the outstanding victory!", Worker #11)
Saying that, as they put it, MLM "can be defended by applying it into the concrete reality" is simply wrong. This leaves out completely the role of and necessity for theoretical struggle (including 2-line struggle). It negates the whole history of development of communist theory that has taken place in the realm of theoretical struggle: including the struggle of Marx and Engels against idealism and mechanical materialism, utopian socialism, various anarchist trends, etc.; Lenin’s struggle against economism, reformism, and the social-chauvinism and revisionism of the 2nd International; Mao’s struggle against the incorrect lines in the Comintern, and the historic battle he initiated and led against modern revisionism and the "capitalist roaders" within the party; etc. In fact, it is not possible to defend communist principles simply by applying them in practice alone. If the CPN(M)’s contention were true, what we would make of the observation that, "Marxism develops in the struggle against revisionism"?

Furthermore, the formulation that, "The only way to develop the scientific ideology is by its application. It develops only when it is applied in a correct way", is wrong as well. By leaving out the necessity for practice (understood broadly) to be summarized and synthesized through the application of materialist dialectics and creative thinking in order for theory to advance, this formulation implies that the leap from perceptual to rational knowledge takes place automatically if theory is "applied in a correct way". In truth, no application of theory to practice, correct or incorrect, can automatically lead to advances in theoretical understanding. The CPN(M)’s "automatically"-line can only result in replacing the science of communism with pragmatism and empiricism.

Moreover, it is not true that only a "correct" application of theory can lead to further theoretical advances as the CPN(M) contends (and leaving aside here the question of how one determines what is "correct"). We can—and indeed must—learn from our mistakes as well as our advances. This too is fundamental to the "ABC’s of Marxism".
Seeking revolutionary answers that advance the struggle for a communist world means of necessity making new breakthroughs in understanding material reality and the necessary ways and means to transform it. Formulating such revolutionary answers can only be done on the basis of applying the dialectical materialist method—not eclecticism and pragmatism—upholding proven principles and on that basis making further advances and leaps in thinking and acting. There is nothing new or innovative in giving up the revolutionary struggle for a communist world to become a mainstream political party dedicated to capitalist "development", which, no matter the intentions involved, can only mean exploitation and oppression for the masses. Justifying all this in the name of "practical" advance and "realistic" goals is an equally well-worn refrain.

In addition to this general point, it should be noted that the demand for "practical answers" contains an element of disingenuousness. Revolution is a complex and multi-faceted process. Without knowing and understanding the details of a concrete situation, it is usually difficult—if not impossible—to formulate correct policy on issues specific to a particular country. To insist on such answers as a prerequisite to—and even as a substitute for—engaging in serious struggle and debate over the cardinal questions involved is really just engaging in political deception instead of principled struggle. The fact is that the overall questions of line at the centre of this debate can and must be understood by all and are not Nepal specific: path of the revolution in the oppressed countries; nature of the state; character and role of democracy; nature of socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat; nature and role of the communist vanguard; laws of motion and development of capital; dialectical materialism; nationalism and internationalism; world strategic framework; etc.

Many have been puzzled by the turn of events in Nepal and they ask: "How is it possible that in Nepal, where such great revolutionary advances have been made and no strategic setback or defeat has been suffered, the party and revolution are on the verge of what might be described as a voluntary collapse?" The answer to this question lies not in some sudden loss of revolutionary will on the part of the leaders, but in the ideological and political line they have been developing and following and the method they have employed to develop that line. In the face of the great new challenges posed by the advance of the revolution in Nepal and the developing perspective of seizing countrywide power, the eclecticism and pragmatism in the method of the CPN(M)’s leadership, combined with the abandonment of basic communist principles (the "ABC’s of Marxism), have eaten up the—formerly principle—revolutionary aspect of their line. This should be an acute lesson to all regarding the decisiveness of line and the danger of denigrating theory. Furthermore, and although many will still resist this fact, it is a profound concrete expression of the truth that without Bob Avakian’s new synthesis Maoism will turn into its opposite.

Conclusion

Everything discussed here, along with the broader analysis made by the RCP and others, makes abundantly clear how serious the situation is. Communists everywhere must uncompromisingly struggle with the comrades of the CPN(M) to assist them in breaking with their wrong method and line and enable their return to the revolutionary path that is illuminated by the fundamental principles of our communist science and ideology.

This will not be easy. This is a real struggle, with real stakes and real consequences. The comrades in Nepal are faced with an extremely difficult situation. Despite—and to an extent because of—the great practical gains their revolution had made, the vision and line leading the CPN(M) has over the years itself become increasingly "landlocked" in eclecticism, pragmatism, empiricism, positivism and nationalism: revisionism. The failure to break with the influence of these wrong tendencies underlies the overall developments that have led to essentially abandoning both the immediate aim of carrying out the new democratic revolution as well as the strategic goal of world communism, and even the basic stand, viewpoint and method of dialectical and historical materialism.

Without understanding this basic truth themselves, it will not be possible for the comrades of the CPN(M) to recognize and correct their errors. The fate of the revolution in Nepal—and the potential for a great advance in our struggle worldwide—depends upon our making every effort to both wage, and win, this battle. How well this is carried out, will in turn—and regardless of the outcome in Nepal itself—have a tremendous impact on shaping the conditions for the further advance of proletarian revolution around the world.

With communist greetings,

Revolutionary Communists (FRG), April 2009

Actually the current correct party name is UCPN(M), United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), but in order to avoid confusion we are using the previous—and more widely recognized—party name in this letter.

"On Developments in Nepal and the Stakes for the Communist Movement: Letters to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) from the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, 2005-2008 (With a Reply from the CPN(M), 2006)" published in Revolution #160, March 28, 2009.
These documents are available for downloading at the Revolution newspaper website: http://www.revcom.us/

The three letters from the RCP were written in October 2005, March 2008 and November 2008. The only reply from the CPN(M) is dated July 1, 2006.
This quote is also a refutation of the CPN(M)’s view that the "material basis" for "the counter-revolution" in China was to be found "mainly in the superstructure" (see "Letter to the RCP", pg. 7) as well as their contention that Mao "was late to foresee this situation".
It should be noted here, that at the same time the CPN(M) has been developing a whole list of what, in its view, are basic mistakes it claims our movement has made. However due to its incorrect method, most of these criticisms are just as wrong as the line the party is currently following as a whole.

We might add to this point the following questions: 1. If it is so "easy" to develop and apply strategy to making revolution why were Lenin and the Bolshevik party the only party that was able to carry out a successful revolution in connection with the crisis that emerged in large parts of Europe during and directly after WWI? 2. If strategic questions are so "easy" to understand and answer, why was Lenin the only person in the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party who recognized that the time was ripe to launch an insurrection? If Lenin had lost the struggle to convince the majority to take a correct position on this major strategic question, the Russian revolution may have never taken place at all!

Engels made the following observation regarding this question: "According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas—also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form." (Letter to Bloch, September 21, 1890)

In an interview with Kantipuronline from Jan. 13, 2009 Baburam Bhattarai, a leading member of the CPN(M) who is currently the Finance Minister in the CPN(M)-led government, made the following statement: "We are transitioning from a feudal era to an industrial-capitalist era.… So we want to attract more investment in the industrial sector so that jobs are created within the country and the productivity of labour becomes high. That will lead to double-digit growth within the next three years -- that is our goal. For that the private sector has to play a leading role."

Although in many countries feudal and semi-feudal relations continue to exist on a large scale, these are subsumed by and integrated into the overall capitalist/imperialist relations that dominate on a world scale. This also leaves aside localized barter. This continues to exist, but cannot be the basis for organizing any productive process encompassing a whole society or even large numbers of people. Also, we cannot discuss here the question of the economy of red base areas, although this is an important question in its own right.

This refers to the famous citation from Marx where he said the communist revolution must aim at the elimination of: all classes and class distinctions generally, all the relations of production on which they rest, all the social relations corresponding to them, and all the ideas that result from these social relations.

The CPN(M) has raised the prospect of turning Nepal into the Switzerland of South Asia. By referencing Switzerland, and its relatively high standard of living, it seeks, among other things, to suggest that capitalism/imperialism can in fact meet the basic needs of the people. As the RCP analysis points out, the still relatively high standard of living of broad sections of the masses in many imperialist countries is based upon and impossible without the super-exploitation of the oppressed countries—of which Nepal is one. Nepal cannot become a Switzerland and even if it could, this is not something communists should aspire to or promote. Furthermore, this appeal by the CPN(M) to bourgeois illusions overlooks that one of the key features of the last 20 years of globalization has been the erosion of the material basis for bourgeoisification in the imperialist countries. The current crisis is accelerating this trend.

Switzerland is in many ways the "most privileged" of the imperialist countries in that it has not itself had to build a colonial or neo-colonial empire or engage in inter-imperialist wars to obtain its position. Still, it would be wrong to think that Switzerland is somehow immune to the workings of capitalism/imperialism. Keep in mind that Iceland thought that it had become the "Switzerland of the North Atlantic", but as the current financial/economic crisis unfolded found itself bankrupt overnight with a significant percentage of the population having lost their life’s savings. We are not predicting that the same fate awaits Switzerland anytime soon—but no one should rule this out either.

In the Maoist Information Bulletin #1 that appeared in Jan. 2002 we find the statement that the CPN(M) was seeking "…to find a political solution in the form of an interim government, a new constitution and institutionalization of the republic", and was prepared "to go for the election of a constituent assembly to settle the question of a republic".

We believe it is correct to make this assessment of the "three conditions" when they were first proposed in 2001 because especially the "election to a constituent assembly" implied that it was possible to establish a new democratic state through parliamentary means. This is simply not true. The CPN(M) repeatedly stated it would abide by the outcome of the election, no matter what it was, and that it would not return to armed struggle once this election was held. This was tantamount to saying that the fate of the revolution was dependent on the outcome of an election. No genuine communist can accept such a proposition. The objective necessity for making revolution does not depend on what a "majority" might think at any particular time. To suggest such a thing is to depart from a basic communist understanding and principles and would mean in practice that no revolution would ever be made or even attempted. At various times we heard informal pragmatic arguments that this approach was not wrong because; 1. The enemy would never agree to hold such an election, 2. The CPN(M) was certain to "win" such an election, and 3. Since the masses have the "right to rebel", even though the CPN(M) agreed to abide by the outcome, if the outcome was "unfavorable" the masses were not bound by it. From the standpoint of scientific communism, all these arguments are wrong as well.
The specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat in countries where the path of the revolution requires two stages: new democracy followed by socialism.

While it is true that the overall world balance of power between revolution and reaction is currently in favour of reaction, it is hard to see how the CPN(M) could claim that that this was also true within Nepal itself, especially while at the same time maintaining that the PW was in the stage of the strategic offensive. It makes no effort to concretely explain how this was the case. Furthermore this statement is one-sided and acts as if the overall unfavourable balance of power is static and permanent. Not only does it fail to see the positive aspects of the overall situation, including the current difficulties US-imperialism is experiencing and the contradictions among the imperialists and reactionaries, but also sees no role for communist-led revolution as a dynamic factor for actively changing this.

We should note here that there has been some effort on the part of the CPN(M) to redefine the meaning of the "strategic offensive" in a PW into some kind of "political" offensive aimed at elections or the writing of a new constitution. This approach confounds politics and warfare – two qualitatively different forms of human activity – and is typical for the eclectic method they have adopted.
For example, in its letter to the RCP the CPN(M) states: "It is a geographical fact that our country, inhabited only by 25 million people, is sandwiched between two giant nations, India and China, each of which has more than one billion inhabitants. Chinese military strength is being developed so as to counter US imperialism. The Indian army is known to be the fourth-strongest army in the world. From the resources we have in our country and the strength of our PLA, even if we recruit all of the youths within it, we cannot think of defeating either of the armies neighbouring us, let alone the US imperialist army, to defend our geographical integrity from foreign military aggression." (pg. 10)
These arguments were based upon, or connected with, the assertion that the revolution in Nepal had to pass through an "anti-monarchical stage". This was supposedly an historically unprecedented set of conditions and necessitated the "creative development" of the theory of new democratic revolution. In particular, the March 2008 letter from the RCP explains in depth why this assertion is wrong.
In the CPN(M) Central Committee Report from Nov. 2005 we find: "In the concrete condition of today, our party can establish its leadership in the movement only by going forward firmly, actively and responsibly in the question of organising interim government, electing constituent assembly and establishing democratic republic with extensive reorganisation in the state power and with the force of struggle by uniting entire republican forces against the feudal autocratic monarchy. After the collapse of the monarchy dominant in the old state, this slogan can play a role of forward-looking political way out for the peaceful resolution of civil war. This slogan addresses correctly the people’s aspiration of change and peace for it can open up a door of peaceful resolution of civil war, and as a consequence can play a positive role for the preparation of insurrection too."

In addition, the 12-point agreement the CPN(M) signed in Nov. 2005 with the Seven Party Alliance played a significant role in bringing about an alignment of forces less favourable to the revolution. The 12-point agreement is the political agreement between the CPN(M) and the principal bourgeois parties which was later developed into the Comprehensive Peace Accords (November 2006).

In particular, when the CPN(M) first announced the conditions under which it was prepared to end the People’s War we considered this to be a very questionable development. While we disagreed with making such proposals, we considered the actual terms being proposed as unrealizable in practice and therefore seriously underestimated the danger posed by the ideological and political line that such a proposal represented. This line, as expressed in the proposed terms for a "settlement", has a very large pragmatic component. Ironically, in retrospect we must conclude that underestmates the danger it posed reflects the influence of pragmatism as well.

Not to mention that the communist movement as a whole could only come into existence after Marx and Engels made their theoretical breakthroughs.