Iran is not a Twitter Revolution

View of the Poor Righteous Party of the Black Nation on Iran

In Iran, the CC notes, inter-ruling class conflict within the framework of a world dominated by imperialism, is at the root of the current upheaval. On another level, US imperialism counterrevolutionary offensive against the Muslim world is expressed as increasing intervention in Iranian society.

The CC condemns and opposes all imperialist meddling in Iran and the CC defends and respects the sovereignty of the Iranian nation. Socialist revolution is needed in Iran. The CC expressed its solidarity with the progressive sectors of the Iranian society and pointed out that the socialist liberation of Iran, by its own independent revolutionary forces representing the popular classes, is the integral part of the world proletarian revolution.

In connection, the CC also takes issue with opportunist trends based in the First World, which has been joining with the imperialist chorus of “voting fraud”, taking this as unhelpful to the anti-imperialist struggle.


Read full Report of PRPBN on Global Situation
http://peacecomrade.org/

The Third Camp in Iran - Mehdi Kouhestaninejad: The destabilization of Iran is not coming from outside forces

On the Nepal Debate by Ben Petersen

The revolution in Nepal has been nothing if not controversial, and naturally, as it has evolved and found its own way to progress in response to the conditions it faced, there has been an increasing amount of debate, and confusion about this process. In this debate there are a number of people who have, most probably unintentionally, come to incorrect conclusions, based on certain myths and misunderstandings that surround the situation in Nepal.

A revolution is and will always be the organic expression of the oppressed classes within a given situation. For revolutionaries on the outside of a revolution looking in, to see the revolution we need to look at the concrete situation it is in, look at the forces in play, find overall trajectories and only then make an analysis based on this. Revolutions look different in different situations. Russia, China, Cuba and Vietnam all had very different paths to power, but they were all revolutions, and we know this because of the class forces being mobilized, the nature of the leadership and the final outcomes of these struggles.

We know these were revolutions, thus they have certain similarities. In looking at new revolutions, we look for these similarities, we do not denounce them because of the naturally occurring differences which will always emerge from them when facing different situations.

Which brings us to Nepal. There is allot of confusion about the process that is unfolding there. There is agreement that in 1996 the Communist Party Nepal (Maoist) left the parliament and launched a peoples war, which was able to gain significant momentum. Within a few years hundreds of thousands, if not millions of the rural poor joined the Maoist movement and were able to control the vast majority of the country, inflicting many defeats on the army and the police. In 2005 they made alliances with the now illegal mainstream parties against the monarchy, and after a massive peoples uprising in 2006 joined a peace process. Here there are some common misunderstandings.

An incorrect analysis of Nepal states that the leadership has embraced reformist politics by abandoning “Red Power” in 80% of the country to be allowed into a petit bourgeois electoral system. It clearly goes against the traditional Maoist strategy of surrounding the cities with the Peoples army and then invading. Thus, the revolutionary leadership in Nepal have betrayed the peoples sacrifices made in the Peoples War to be integrated into the bureaucracy and for personal gain of the leadership at the expense of the revolution.

This analysis is based largely on myths and has to totally ignore the reality of the situation. It is incompatible with the actual balance of forces and in total contradiction to the processes at play. Furthermore, it totally ignores the actions and policies of the party leadership.

The first myth that this is based on is that by 2005 the Maoists and their People’s Liberation Army had complete control over 80% of Nepal. This is not true. By 2005 the PLA had de facto control over 80% of the country. The difference is seemingly small, but significant. The Maoists did control a new pro people local administration, they did set up peoples councils, they did have the peoples courts. However, all of these things needed to exist at very least semi-underground. The central Royalist state was still superior. While it wasn’t strong enough to be able to continue raising taxes or maintain its apparatus on a permanent basis in most of the country, it was still in control. It controlled the major urban centers, and the majority of the transportation system, and therefore, controlled the economy. The situation was therefore not one of two separate and relatively equal states struggling against each other, but rather, there was a new state emerging, but it was in every way except politically, inferior to its counterpart. There was no fully permanent alternative state.

This state was still weak and not fully mature. They were unable to make significant development projects, the political leadership of the peoples state had to live underground and was in constant danger of being murdered at the hands of the army/police. Even the communes had been burned down at different times. The revolutionaries needed to find a way to move forward, to strengthen their forces and overcome the royalist state.

In no way should the Peoples State in Nepal be dismissed, it was a highly significant part of the peoples war, and was able to make significant gains for women, people of low caste, ethnic nationalities and local governance, however, this state simply was not strong enough to be able to stand on its own against the central Kathmandu government. In time, it may have been able to develop into such a state, however this would have been a long and bloody process, and events transpired which fast tracked the revolution and brought urban areas and across the country. This was the conquest of one state over the other, but it was politically, and not physically or militarily.

This all ties in with another myth, that the PLA was militarily equal to or greater then the Royal Nepalese Army. This is not the case. The PLA was politically and tactically far superior to the RNA, and this was the root of its success. The PLA was able to attack the RNA at its weakest points, or too pool its resources to overcome RNA bases or capture some large towns temporarily, but in set piece battles, or on permanent front lines, the PLA was inferior. Even by this late stage in the war, if they got together enough armed men, there was nowhere that the RNA could not go. Some places would be guaranteed to be expensive and for them to take heavy casualties, but there was not one inch of ground that was absolutely liberated. If the Peoples Army could have stormed Kathmandu, or been able to have done so in the foreseeable future, they would have done so.

In 2005 this was the situation. The revolutionary forces had de facto control of the nation. They were totally politically superior, and had the army well and truly on the defensive, a new peoples state was in existence. This said, there was still a long road to victory. The central state was shaken, but still stable. The end was not in sight.

Enter the Jana Andolan (Peoples Movement) in 2006. There are two particularly common misunderstandings relating to the Jana Adolan. First, that after the Jana Andolan the Maoists gave up aspirations of capturing Kathmandu. Secondly, that the Maoists did not display sufficient political leadership to this revolutionary situation and “sold out” at the expense of the people in the street.

Jana Andolan did in a way signal the end of the Peoples War, but this was not because the Maoists gave up on the war, in fact, the Jana Andolan was a direct result of the People’s War, its most decisive and final battle. The people of Kathmandu stood up for a republic, for the end of the monarchy and corruption, and for a new Nepal–these were the demands of the Maoists. It is true that the Maoists didn’t conquer Kathmandu by the might of its PLA, but this was the wave of the Revolution crashing into Kathmandu all the same. The revolution did conquer Kathmandu–not by might of arms, but through the might of revolutionary political ideas.

There has been some criticism of the revolutionary leadership during the Jana Andolan, and if they had been “more red” the Jana Andolan uprising could have completed the revolution then and there. At this stage public revolutionary consciousness was not yet high enough to complete a revolutionary process. People were united by a common hatred of the autocratic monarchy, but other then that the movement was very divided, liberals, soft monarchists, democrats and social-democrats all had considerable influence on the movement, as well as revolutionaries. The need to radically reorganize society, the economy, and the state, was not–and still is not quite yet–recognized by the mass of the population.

To reach this level of consciousness there needs to be a party-mass dynamic. The party provides revolutionary leadership and is constantly in contact with its mass base, working with them, taking up their struggles and their suggestions. The masses, if convinced by the situation and the politics of the party, will follow it. The party ultimately aims to lead the masses, but can only ever go as far or as fast as the situation permits. In the end, the revolutionary leadership must take its directions from the base. Any revolutionary party that tries to do otherwise immediately loses the support of the people, and its ability to influence the political situation evaporates.

During the Jana Andolan it meant that the Maoists pushed for and won a constituent assembly. Without the revolutionary leadership it is likely that the “mainstream” political parties would have just amended the old constitution to limit the monarch’s powers further, it was only the revolutionary leadership of the Maoists that pushed the other parties to ensuring that a new constitution was written by elected representatives. This increased popular support for the revolutionaries, which gives them a greater ability to push for bigger goals. The Maoists have taken a consistent revolutionary stand.

The Maoists entered into government not because they have abandoned revolutionary goals but in response to public opinion and to show the need for revolutionary goals. After winning the election, they had the right–by the logic of the bourgeois state–to form government and create legislation. As Marxists, we understand that the state has a class basis, however no one is born with that knowledge. The Maoists time in government showed in practice that no matter what people vote for, a revolution can not be simply elected. More then any speeches the experience of a people’s government in a bourgeois state has shown the masses of people that radical change is necessary, when previously many had illusions in the prospects of a peaceful gradual change. It has become apparent that imperialism is central to the state to the people of Nepal, not because the Maoists said so, but because of the role of the India and American governments in overthrowing the elected government. With only propaganda, revolutionaries would have struggled to convince a majority of people, but, by making principled decisions, more and more people have been pushed into the revolutionary camp, and have become open to revolutionary ideas.

At this stage there has not been a revolution, and a revolutionary peoples state has not been created, but the party is still very clear that this is still its objective, and is currently in a lengthy process of discussion as to how best to achieve this aim.

So it is also important to talk about the Maoists stated goals for the post-revolutionary state. In some circles they have caused considerable controversy particularly, with their statements that the future peoples state and their belief that the new revolutionary state can be a multi-party state. This comes from the UCPN(M) coming to a new synthesis based on their own experience during their own revolution, and by analyzing the historic examples of socialism and their downfall.

The impetus for this came from their analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and China. In short, the party came to the agreement that both these revolutions–despite the active involvement of the oppressed working classes–still succumbed to bureaucratic degeneration, and thus were eventually overthrown. Therefore, it becomes obvious that future revolutions need to find ways to prevent these kinds of outcomes from happening again. The idea of multi-party elections in a workers and peasants state is an attempt to allow room for working people to be able to have the space to overcome corruption and errors in the revolution and the revolutionary party, should they occur.

First it needs to be recognized that having multiple parties within a peoples state, is not an oxymoron, and in fact has historical precedent. At the beginning of the USSR after the October revolution, the Bolshevik party was initially in coalition with the left Socialist Revolutionaries, and certain factions of the Mensheviks were tolerated as well. These separate parties were under no restrictions within the workers state initially and were only removed from it after they degenerated and started acting against the interests of the state itself. During the revolution in Cuba there was no a single revolutionary party, there were in fact three, the July 26th Movement, the Revolutionary Directorate and the Popular Socialist Party. There eventually merged into a single party, but the fact is that the idea that within each situation there is and will only ever be one party that is absolutely “correct”, is not true.

The role of the revolutionary process is to destroy the old state (of the bourgeois class) and replace it with state structures that represent the working class (proletariat) . State structure include the laws and court systems, education systems, as well as a number of other structures. Once the state has been set up and secured, firmly in the hands of the proletariat, then the proletariat has every right to organise and be active within the boundaries of that state, especially around questions of the running that state. Exceptions can be foreseen, such as the situation in the civil war in Russia, or the current situation in Cuba, where external forces and pressure make this desirable situation impossible. There are no contradictions, historically or ideologically, that mean that the revolution at all times is a monolithic party affair.

Within Nepal revolutionaries have already used this tactic within their parallel state structures during the peoples war. Elections were held, and what forces for the opposition parties were left in these areas were allowed to participate. It opened a way for the revolutionaries to get feedback from the grassroots. In some areas these opposition groups did quite well in these elections, and this showed the Maoist party in which areas they were not fulfilling their tasks well, in which areas there had developed a bureaucracy or an automatic way of doing things, and in which areas they needed to improve. In this way they were able to build more responsive party, with closer links to the masses.

Finally, there has been much speculation as to the role that a Nepalese revolution plays in the international situation.

When looking at Nepal and the international situation, the limitations of Nepal are immediately apparent. It is a landlocked nation, with an unbelievably underdeveloped economy, and is wedged between two superpowers, in a region with relatively weak socialist movements, and in a time where the socialist block is gone and Communist China exists only in name. The whole situation is pretty overwhelming for such a tiny Himalayan country.

So what are the responsibilities and possibilities for a revolutionary and internationalist force in Nepal.

By no means should we think the revolution is doomed. While USSR and China’s support was very welcome, it also brought with it distortions of their own, and sometimes limited the creativity of organic revolutionary movements, so on one level it does free up the Nepali comrades politically, albeit with limitations economically. Furthermore, the emerging revolutions in Latin America can provide a potential source of diplomatic and economic support, however limited it may be as these are also largely impoverished countries.

They do have an enormous responsibility to international revolution. Revolutions spread. Revolutions give an example that give evidence to revolutionaries claims for what is possible, can give ideological and logistical support to their comrades overseas and challenge the status quo in one country, which entices people to challenge the elite in their own. Historically we can see this, the situations in Europe following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 (Germany in particular), the role China had in inspiring revolutionaries in Vietnam and the Naxalites in India, the international phenomenon of 1968. Things spread. It is no coincidence that Latin America is now a hotbed of revolution, as there has been a socialist state, existing and providing an alternative example for the last 5 decades. In this time Cuba providing diplomatic, economic, ideological, and even military support for revolutions despite its own economic limitations.

Nepal’s has an opportunity to take state power and create a peoples state. Its first responsibility to international revolutions is to do that, and create state systems that are more representative, and re-gear the economy to focus on peoples needs rather then the needs of bureaucrats and monarchists. In doing so that provides an example–and proof to people, particularly in the subcontinent– that there is an alternative. The subcontinent has never had a revolutionary organization as successful as the Nepali Maoists. Even the Naxalite movement in its hey-day was nowhere near the level of challenging for state power. The power of example is enormous.

At any rate, the revolution is ongoing. It is by no means guaranteed success, the challenges are enormous, but the struggle has not yet come to its conclusion. Where it will go we do not know, but at this stage there is no reason to abandon hope for the direction of that struggle.

http://www.maobadiwatch.blogspot.com/

On Iran’s Elections: Legitimacy, Fraud, and Openings for Revolution by Mike Ely

Is the winner legitimate here too?

The issue for revolutionaries is really not whether Ahmadinejad ‘legitimately won’ most of the votes or not? Who gives a shit ultimately? The election itself is not legitimate — because this whole system is an oppressors’ system, a dictatorship of mullahs resting on a structure of capitalism. It is all illegitimate, and needs to be seen that way. And swept away.

by Mike Ely


So what is the point of all this hashing (among leftists) over “Did Ahmadinejad really win or not? Did he have a landslide?”

It is very strange to see some argue that if Ahmadinejad won without fraud — then he has a legitimate right to rule.

Who set those terms for this moment? Who decided that this is a measure of who is right, and who is wrong in Iran, in the larger world?

There is in that a strange legitimizing of bourgeois politics (in both Iran and by extension in the U.S. too.)

And it comes out sharply when people start portraying the Islamic theocracy in Iran as some kind of advance, as something precious. For example, the Workers World (see “What Fraud?“), connects their defense of Ahmadinejad with such positive assessment of the Iranian system:

” The Iranian people have benefited enormously from their revolution and cannot easily be turned back.”

I rejected this notion of “gains of 1979” elsewhere, and won’t repeat those arguments here.

But the basic fact is all these governments are bullshit (the U.S., Iran, the Iraq of Saddam Hussein and of today, Russia, France, and so on around the world): They all represent oppressors and criminals — without exception. All of their various electoral systems are carefully and institutionally rigged — stacked against the people’s interests in fundamental ways. And they all routinely involve layers of fraud, manipulation, demagoguery, deceit, bribery, coverup and much more.

But then, there come moments (flashes of conjuncture) when the nature of these political structures becomes VISIBLE more broadly. The underlying reality becomes VISIBLE to millions. There is a de-legitimization of institutions and governments that deserve no legitimacy. And it is a good thing for birthing more radical revolutionary movements.

Some initial thoughts:

In Iran: This election was rigged — fundamentally — in the sense that only supporters of the status quo could get in — and in the sense that any real opponents of this order have faced prison, torture and execution.

This particular “rigging” is a form that the “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie” takes in Iran. Electoral democracy is typically “rigged” in capitalist countries — in the U.S. it is done by the two party mechanism, the winner take all system, the need for zillions of dollars to be a “serious candidate,” the media ability to decide who is “credible” and who is “fringe” and so on.

And for many different reasons, there has been widespread frustration in Iran among more secular and change-minded people with that whole arrangement (including the political system where candidates must be pre-approved based on their support for a basic theocracy.)

This was not simply a matter of “stolen ballots” — but a long building frustration with the state of politics.

Or to put it another way: Would this Iranian election be “fair and just” and a legitimate expression of the people will – if (somehow) millions of ballots weren’t miscounted? Say there was massive fraud, but it can be shown that Ahmadinejad would have won without that fraud, should we then say “ok, this need not be de-legitimizing, and anger of the fraud is not particularly justified”?

Watergate Makes Nixon’s Landslide Irrelevant


An analogy: in 1972, the war criminal Nixon faced an election. He did all kinds of sinister covert “dirty tricks” (including the Watergate plumbers’ break-in of the Democratic Party national headquarters). And Nixon won by a landslide, crushing the vaguely antiwar Democrat George McGovern.

Now, there was fury when the Watergate misdeeds came to light. It was deeply de-legitimizing for this President (and for the system itself). And the scandal led to his disgrace and resignation.

The truth remains that he won the 1972 election, and would have won it without “dirty tricks.” And (like Ahmadinejad) Nixon credited the “silent majority” — especially conservative working people soon to be known as “Reagan Democrats.”

Nixon won by a landslide, but so what? Is that the issue? An issue? Does it mean that he had a right to rule, and the exposure of fraud was a thwarting of the people’s “real” will? No.

The whole set up was rigged anyway — it was stacked against our struggle for change, and our struggle against the war. The fact is that the election scandal exposed Nixon, and the “normal” operations of this system. People felt disenfranchised for many reasons (mainly in that an unpopular war had continued for seven years without any visible way of stopping it) — but the exposure of the fraud and coverup was a spark (from within the inner-fighting of the ruling classes) that had a huge effect on broad popular disenchantment. (It didn’t so much disenchant the already radicalized! we already HATED Nixon with a bright blue passion! It touched much more broadly.)

Broad popular outrage often erupts from things that don’t particularly enrage us revolutionaries. After the sixties’ radicalized have been brutalized, and Cointelpro-ized after the Panthers were shot down — it was hard for radicals to be PARTICULARLY infuriated and indignant when Nixon’s plumbers just bugged some friggin phone in the Democratic Party HQs…. i mean WTF?

But for millions of new and less radical people it was a historic outrage and the last straw.

And wouldn’t it have been odd, for communists somewhere, to say “yeah but don’t forget, Nixon did win by a landslide, and he had the support of most working people….” and so on.

No, in such moments, communists united with that mass outrage, with the demands that Nixon be forced out — and debated how to do such work in ways that would advance revolutionary and communist goals.

An Opening In Iran, Finally, After a Long Awful Time

So here is the deal: In Iran, in the aftermath of this election, there was, obviously, a widespread feeling that it has all been fixed. In areas, the opposition had apparently been expect to win, and didn’t. The outcome was so disappointing, and hopes had been so high ,that millions of people felt robbed. And millions truly believed that Ahmadinejad could only have survived in power by stealing the election.

This feeling combined the deeper malaise and frustration with a flashpoint. And brought new forces and new illegitimacy into the mix.

The issue really is not whether Ahmadinejad “legitmimatly won” a majority or not? Who gives a shit ultimately? The election is not legitmiate — because this whole system is an oppressors’ system, a dictatorship of mullahs resting on a structure of capitalism. It is all illegitimate, and needs to be seen that way

Another analogy: Compare this to the Bush-Gore farrago over Florida. That election (and all elections in the U.S.) was “rigged” before any voting started — some reliable, tested imperialist chief was going to win. One or another of these cliques was going to the White House. There were shades of difference in politics and personality (obviously) but both were totally committed to this system, this empire, capitalism, and many of the common strategic and policy frameworks that do unite the ruling class. In essense, the system presented people with a choice that was no choice.

But then, when it hung by a thread and the Supreme Court of majority Republicans pushed it into the Republican column — there was an additional de-legitimization (on the system’s own terms) — and it produced a larger crisis.

The issue (for revolutionaries) was never “Did Gore really win Florida?” We didn’t feel “We wuz robbed!”

The issue (for revolutionaries) was that this was a crack in the legitimacy of this system that dragged millions of people into political life. And also there was a feel of a rolling coup here –of highly questionable moves toward a one party system (where the heights of power –Ccongress, the military, Supreme Court and the White House — were all of converging on the same rightwing politics.

Usually elections legitimize the next pig-to-be-president. But in this case the 2000 election semi-permanently de-legitimized Bush for a big sections of the population and this is afavorable condition for struggle and revolutinary political work. And this was a good thing — especially given that emergence of a “rolling coup” which needed to be opposed.

The same is true in Iran — the de-legitimization of the Islamic Republic is a good thing for revolutionary openings.

It is also a “good thing” for other forces wanting openings (including sinister forces of many kinds). And there ARE other forces (including some wanting closer relations with the U.S.) But so what? Such contradictions are not only common but inherent in abrupt political crisis and change.

We need a dynamic and forward-looking approach to events — that perceives the chances for advancing a revolutionary politics against all the forces of class society. To view things as a pick or choose of “evils” (pick Iran’s government or the U.S.) is to display a profoundly demoralized and mistaken sense of what is possible in our world.

http://mikeely.wordpress.com/

Open letter of support to the demonstrators in Iran!

Open letter of support to the demonstrators in Iran!

This morning Ayatollah Ali Khamenei demanded an end to the massive and forceful demonstrations protesting the controversial result of last week's election. He argued that to make concessions to popular demands and 'illegal' pressure would amount to a form of 'dictatorship', and he warned the protestors that they, rather than the police, would be held responsible for any further violence.

Khamenei's argument sounds familiar to anyone interested in the politics of collective action, since it appears to draw on the logic used by state authorities to oppose most of the great popular mobilisations of modern times, from 1789 in France to 1979 in Iran itself. These mobilisations took shape through a struggle to assert the principle that sovereignty rests with the people themselves, rather than with the state or its representatives. 'No government can justly claim authority', as South Africa's ANC militants put it in their Freedom Charter of 1955, 'unless it is based on the will of all the people.'

Needless to say it is up to the people of Iran to determine their own political course. Foreign observers inspired by the courage of those demonstrating in Iran this past week are nevertheless entitled to point out that a government which claims to represent the will of its people can only do so if it respects the most basic preconditions for the determination of such a will: the freedom of the people to assemble, unhindered, as an inclusive collective force; the capacity of the people, without restrictions on debate or access to information, to deliberate, decide and implement a shared course of action.

Years of foreign-sponsored 'democracy promotion' in various parts of the world have helped to spread a well-founded scepticism about civic movements which claim some sort of direct democratic legitimacy. But the principle itself remains as clear as ever: only the people themselves can determine the value of such claims. We the undersigned call on the government of Iran to take no action that might discourage such determination.



Peter Hallward
Middlesex University, UK.

Alberto Toscano
Goldsmiths College, UK.

This letter is also signed by:


Alenka Zupancic, Institute of Philosophy of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Alexander Garcia Duttmann, Goldsmiths College
Etienne Balibar, Paris X, Nanterre, and University of California, Irvine
Eyal Weizman, Director, Centre for Research Architecture, Dept. of Visual Cultures
Goldsmiths, University of London
Judith Butler, University of California, Berkeley
Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor (retired), MIT, Cambridge MA USA
Philip Pettit, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
Rada Ivekovic, Prof., Collège international de philosophie, Paris.
Slavoj Žižek, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and the European Graduate School

Also signed by the following academics:

Adam Bieniek, PhD, Jagiellonian University, Chair of Arab Studies, Institute of Oriental Philology , Cracow, Poland
Agnieszka Zuk, University of Nancy
Aleksander Glogowski, PhD, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland
Ali Banuazizi, Professor of Political Science and Director, Program in Islamic Civilization and Societies, Boston College
Ali Rezaei, Dept. of Sociology, University of Calgary, Canada
Nader Hashemi,Assistant Professor of Middle East and Islamic Politics
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
Arang Keshavarzian, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, New York University
Asia Bochenska, Department of Kurdish Studies, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland
Beata Kowalska, Jagiellonian University, Poland
Dan Sperber, Institut Jean Nicod, CRNS, Paris
Eric B. Ross, Visiting Professor of Anthropology and International Development Studies, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Farideh Farhi, Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i at Manoa
Farifteh Tavakoli-Borazjani, Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für Iranistik
Farzin Vahdat, Vassar College, New York
Hossein Ziai, Jahangir and Eleanor Amuzegar Chair in Iranian Studies, Director of Iranian Studies, UCLA Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, Los Angeles, CA
Isabelle Dolezalek, Freie Universität Berlin
Jadwiga Pstrusińska, Head of Department of Interdisciplinary Eurasiatic Research, Institute of Oriental Philology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow
Jean-Paul Martinon, Department of Visual Cultures, Goldsmiths College, UK
Joanna Bochenska
Jolan Bogdan, Department of Visual Cultures, Goldsmiths College, UK
Juan R. I. Cole, Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History, University of Michigan
Kazem Alamdari, California State University, Los Angeles
Nayereh Tohidi, Professor, California State University, Northridge
Linda Herrera, Institute of Social Studies (The Hague)
Asef Bayat, University of Leiden
Lynn Schibeci, Dept of History, the University of New Mexico (retired), Albuquerque, New Mexico
Mark Gasiorowski, Political Science and International Studies, Louisiana State University
Martin Steinseifer, Universität Giessen
Martin van Bruinessen, Chair of Comparative Study of Contemporary Muslim Societies, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Utrecht University
Martina Tissberger, Freie Universität Berlin, Department of Educational Sciences and Psychology
Michael McIntyre, International Studies, DePaul University, Chicago
Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, Professor of History and Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto
Norma Claire Moruzzi, University of Illinois at Chicago, Political Science, History, Gender and Women's Studies
Scott Hibbard, DePaul University, Chicago
Seyla Benhabib, Seyla Benhabib, Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven
Jesse Lemisch, Professor Emeritus, History, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, USA
Stephen Engelmann, University of Illinois at Chicago
Talal Asad, Graduate Center, City University of New York
Van Bluemel, Emeritus Professor of Physics at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, in Worcester, MA
Vera Beyer, Kunsthistorisches Institut der Freien Universität Berlin
Dr Riaz Ahmed,Department of Applied Chemistry,University of Karachi, Karachi

UML general secretary hints at early removal of Katawal

General Secretary of the CPN (UML) Ishwor Pokharel has hinted a possible premature termination of Chief of Army Staff Rookmangud Katawal if all political parties agree for the action.

Addressing a function in Sindhulimadi Wednesday, Pokhrel said all political forces in the country must have same position on issues like control and mobilisation of Nepal Army.

He further said his party objected on the removal of Katawal by the Maoist-led government as the Maoists went ahead unilaterally.

He questioned the Maoist leadership, who has repeatedly tagged Madhav Kumar Nepal as a loser in elections, as to why they had asked Nepal to lead the constitutional committee of the constituent assembly.

Additionally, Pokhrel claimed the UML-led coalition government will run till the entrusted tasks are completed.

Criticising the Maoists for their demonstrations on border encroachment, Pokhrel said UML-led government plans to settle all border disputes through dialogue at the diplomatic level.

Live from Baharestan Sq... courtesy of Revolutionary Road

Protesters 'in new Iran clashes'

Government calls for the protests to stop have gone unheeded
Iranian riot police are reported to have clashed with demonstrators defying government decrees to stop street protests over disputed elections.

Eyewitness reports say there have been clashes near the parliament building in the capital Tehran, in the streets around Baharestan Square.

http://shooresh1917.blogspot.com/

CPI (MLM) Communiqué #6:People Beware! Mousavi is not your brother and he is not on your side!

These words might sound unpleasant for many of you engaged in bloody battle with the enemy, but open your eyes and ears!

Mir Hossein Mousavi called on you to “consider the Basiji your brothers”. This means you should consider your brothers those who used knives and machetes on the bodies of your dearest sons and daughters. Mousavi told you “not to consider the army to be against you”. This means considering to be your friends those who under the orders of Khamenei are trying to smash your uprising and are shooting our youth in many corners of the country.

Young people, be alert!

Mousavi claims that “the genuine call of Islamic revolution” is what has moved you. This is a blatant lie. He knows very well that what has moved you is a burning desire to change this world. It’s impossible to change the existing order without overthrowing the Islamic Republic.

Mousavi claimed that “the heritage of the far-sighted Imam [Khomeini]” is what has inspired you. This is also a blatant lie. Khomeini’s first measures after taking power were to slice women’s faces with knives, force them to cover their heads and take away their basic rights. He sent the army to suppress the people of Kurdistan, Khoozistan and Turkmen Sahra. Is that what has inspired you?

Brave young women and men, pay attention to Mousavi’s real demands!

He calls you to “the Islamic revolution as it was and the Islamic Republic as it should be”. He tells you, “You are not against the sacred Islamic Republic system and its legal structures”. He tells you that you must seek reform, “a reform with a return to the pure principles of the Islamic Revolution.. .”

Look at this society drowning in corruption, destruction, superstition, dark religious ignorance, drug addiction and prostitution. These are the fruits of those pure principles. Principles against which you have courageously risen.

Mousavi says, “Many of our problems are the consequence of lies”. But he himself is lying… One of Mousavi’s big lies in 1981 was to slander the Sarbedaran uprising in Iran as “inspired by the Shah”. The Sarbedaran uprising was waged to overthrow the Islamic Republic and save the people’s revolution, but it was defeated. These are facts that you all must know.

In these decisive days, besides bravery and perseverance in the battlefield, you must arm and strengthen your mind with the truths of the last 30 years. These truths light up our road and further strengthen us. Mousavi, with his religious preaching, wants to numb your searching brains. If you know the truth – that the quarrel between Mousavi, Rafsanjani and [opposition figure Mehdi] Karoubi on the one hand, and Khamenei and Ahmadinejad on the other, is a quarrel between two power- and money-hungry Mafia gangs and has nothing to do with your interests – then you can find the real liberating road and dare to scale the heights for your liberation.

Young women and men – fight! But fight with open eyes and lofty goals!

Mousavi’s trademarks are the slogan “God is great” and the [Islamic] colour green. Many of you think that these symbols are important for your unity. But they are first and foremost the symbols of the society that Mousavi promises to build – nothing but the same Islamic Republic with minor reforms to make it stronger.

Is this really the kind of society you want? Is it worth so much sacrifice? Why can’t we make sacrifices for much higher and loftier goals? Why not struggle for a fundamentally different society and future? A society free of all oppression and exploitation. A society where everyone shares and cooperates. Where the equality of women and men is a fundamental and self-evident principle. Where the beautiful scenes of collaboration, mutual help and consideration we are witnessing in our common battles today would be institutionalized. A society that is rid of boredom and stagnation, and always lively and active.

Shouldn’t we think about these things and debate them even in the midst of the battle? In fact it is decisive for the future of our uprising to know what kind of society we want and how we can bring it about. This view, perspective and commitment must be linked up broadly with your anger and struggle today against this bigoted and fraudulent rule. This is the only way to prevent our efforts in this historical juncture from going to waste and prevent us from confusing friends and enemies.

Let’s raise our level of consciousness! And widely stir debate among the masses!

Form revolutionary cells of the most advanced young women and men in each neighbourhood, factory and university to widely distribute leaflets, do exposures and raise consciousness among the masses and bring more people into the various militant struggles.


First published on Kasama but source World to Win News Service
http://mikeely.wordpress.com/

'Maoists revolt incomplete, next uprising urgent'

Source TGW

The United Maoists Party’s senior leader Mr. Mohan Baidya Pokharel alias Kiran has opined that the Maoists party should take the path to Peoples’ Uprising-III to form the Maoists’ led National Government.

Mr. Baidya made these remarks talking to journalists on Tuesday June 23, 2009.

“The deadlock must come to an end through the third peoples’ revolt and ultimately to form the National Government, said Kiran.

“The Imperialists and Expansionists foreign powers have provided this puppet government a shape under the command of Madhav Kumar Nepal”, said Kiran adding that the formation of the puppet government is against the mandate of the Nepali population.

“The Maoists’ led revolt is yet incomplete…the next revolt will ensure Peoples’ Republican order and safeguard Nepal’s unique identity”, Kiran also said.

To add, in the ongoing Maoists’ politburo meeting, Maoists leaders C.P. Gajurel, Netra Bikram Chand and Dev Gurung have stood in favor of Mr. Baidya’s line.

Speaking at the ongoing PB meeting, the leaders on Tuesday criticized the Party chief Puspa Kamal Dahal’s 19 Page Proposal and made remarks in favor of Mr. Baidya.

“They held that Dahal’s proposal was incomplete and favored yet another revolt to ensure peoples’ supremacy”, reports quote Maoists sources as saying.

Those who spoke in favor of Party Chairman Dahal were Posta Bahadur Bogati, Barsa Man Pun and Girija Raj Mani Pokharel.