Dear comrades,
Currently the consensus in the Indian revolutionary left is that the Nepali Party (UCPN-Maoist) will not use an insurgency strategy to capture state power in the next 3 weeks (i.e. the constitutional deadline of May 28th, 2010) and will come to a consensual compromise with the Nepali Congress and/or CPN(United Marxist Leninist) and will build some kind of 'unity government'. Two major theories are given for this: 1) there is no desire by the Nepali leadership to actually capture power through such means as they believe that they can simply be elected, and thus will continuously compromise or 2) that the Nepali will not capture power as they currently lack the urban infrastructure to actually do so i.e. that although they have developed urban mass organizations they still do not have the appropriate balance of forces, and indeed have actually lost ground since Jan Andolan 2 when they could have used the PLA to capture the State. Also at the time the popular mass anger was against the King and the monarchy, but even then they lacked the necessary dual power situation needed in the urban center (the dual power situation in the country-side apparently remains intact with the Party controlling the basic organs of power i.e. the Village Development Committees).
The urban movement although having grown in membership in the mass organizations has been slow and not kept up with the urban disillusionment due to the downgrading of urban infrastructure due to the influx of dispossessed people from the people's war. Thus, during the recent general strike it was maintained and sustained largely by rural cadre. This was further exacerbated by the fact that the Nepali Party have painted themselves into a corner by accepting Indian, American and UN involvement. Thus, any attempt to bring the PLA out of the cantonments will be met with isolation, condemnation and possibly military incursion. The current 'Communist Andolan' can be nothing more than a pressure tactic to get the State and other parties to arrive at a better compromise.
Furthermore, some ML forces also argue that the Nepali Maoists fundamentally misunderstood the character of the Indian State and believe that a suitable compromise can be struck with India (a similar deal has been made with China apparently, with whom Prachanda is close) against 'imperialism' rather, than understanding the nature of Indian expansionism is itself in concert with imperialism (the main architect of the Nepali strategy is apparently Dr. Baburam Bhattarai). This has also resulted in strategic mistakes that ensures that State-capture is not possible. Perhaps unsurprisingly Bhattarai is the Indian choice over Prachanda for the Prime Minister-ship of the consensus government if a Maoist leader has to be chosen (although some argue that that this is more of a tactic by India to sow divisions within the Maoist ranks).
It is only through working out these series of contradictions can the Maoists capture State-power if that indeed is their goal, but the Indian forces do not believe that this to be possible unless the leadership of Nepal is able to correct many of the "errors" that have been made since 2006. But as Mao said, "The Revolution is not a dinner party".
Lal salaam.
Currently the consensus in the Indian revolutionary left is that the Nepali Party (UCPN-Maoist) will not use an insurgency strategy to capture state power in the next 3 weeks (i.e. the constitutional deadline of May 28th, 2010) and will come to a consensual compromise with the Nepali Congress and/or CPN(United Marxist Leninist) and will build some kind of 'unity government'. Two major theories are given for this: 1) there is no desire by the Nepali leadership to actually capture power through such means as they believe that they can simply be elected, and thus will continuously compromise or 2) that the Nepali will not capture power as they currently lack the urban infrastructure to actually do so i.e. that although they have developed urban mass organizations they still do not have the appropriate balance of forces, and indeed have actually lost ground since Jan Andolan 2 when they could have used the PLA to capture the State. Also at the time the popular mass anger was against the King and the monarchy, but even then they lacked the necessary dual power situation needed in the urban center (the dual power situation in the country-side apparently remains intact with the Party controlling the basic organs of power i.e. the Village Development Committees).
The urban movement although having grown in membership in the mass organizations has been slow and not kept up with the urban disillusionment due to the downgrading of urban infrastructure due to the influx of dispossessed people from the people's war. Thus, during the recent general strike it was maintained and sustained largely by rural cadre. This was further exacerbated by the fact that the Nepali Party have painted themselves into a corner by accepting Indian, American and UN involvement. Thus, any attempt to bring the PLA out of the cantonments will be met with isolation, condemnation and possibly military incursion. The current 'Communist Andolan' can be nothing more than a pressure tactic to get the State and other parties to arrive at a better compromise.
Furthermore, some ML forces also argue that the Nepali Maoists fundamentally misunderstood the character of the Indian State and believe that a suitable compromise can be struck with India (a similar deal has been made with China apparently, with whom Prachanda is close) against 'imperialism' rather, than understanding the nature of Indian expansionism is itself in concert with imperialism (the main architect of the Nepali strategy is apparently Dr. Baburam Bhattarai). This has also resulted in strategic mistakes that ensures that State-capture is not possible. Perhaps unsurprisingly Bhattarai is the Indian choice over Prachanda for the Prime Minister-ship of the consensus government if a Maoist leader has to be chosen (although some argue that that this is more of a tactic by India to sow divisions within the Maoist ranks).
It is only through working out these series of contradictions can the Maoists capture State-power if that indeed is their goal, but the Indian forces do not believe that this to be possible unless the leadership of Nepal is able to correct many of the "errors" that have been made since 2006. But as Mao said, "The Revolution is not a dinner party".
Lal salaam.
For more on Dhruv Jain's writings from Nepal visit :
http://stormingmteverest.blogspot.com/
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